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1 .  Data and Claim 
Daniel Buring 
Cologne University 
This paper deals with scope inversion of two operators. Relevant examples from 
German are given in (1) and (2) «l.a) from Jacobs 1984,  (l .b) from LObner 
1990) : 
(1) a. AIle Politiker sind nicht korrupt. 
all politicians are not corrupt 
i. 'No politician is corrupt. ' 
ii. 'It is not the case that all politicians are corrupt. ' 
b. Du mu.St nicht soviel rauchen. 
you must not so much smoke 
i. 'You mustn't smoke that much . '  
ii. 'You don't have to smoke that much. ' 
(2) a. I ALLE Politiker sind NICH1\ korrupt. 
only reading ( 1 .a'ii) 
b. Du IMUSST NICHT\ soviel rauchen. 
only reading (1 .b 'ii) 
Unlike the sentences in (1),  which are ambiguous as indicated in the translations, 
the string identical sentences in (2) are unambiguous. Note that in (2) we fmd a 
rising pitch accent - indicated by I - on the subject and the modal verb, 
respectively. This we call a Topic accent. In both sentences a falling accent -
given as \ - is on the negation, the Focus accent. What I will try to show is that 
this disambiguating effect can be made to follow directly from the semantics and 
pragmatics of Topic and Focus marking as proposed in Biiring 1994 and Biiring 
in prep. In more detail, the plot goes as follows: 
• The sentences are structurally ambiguous by LF at latest. 
• The intonational contour, in particular the Topic accent, leads to certain 
implicatures which differ for both LFs. 
• Depending on the lexical meanings of the items involved, these implicatures 
may be reasonable or not. 
• In case only one of two LFs yields reasonable implicatures , that LF is the 
sole legitimate representation for the sentence in question. 
It is worthwhile to stress the last point. The claim that I am making is that the 
requirement ' have reasonable implicatures' can act as a filter on LF 
representations. Given a structurally ambiguous sentence, we might end up with 
only one virtual meaning. This  will happen if the intonational pattern induces 
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implicatures which - in one case - are not reasonable, in a sense to be made 
explicit below . 
Before going on I should point out that the phenomenon illustrated in 
(l .a)/(2 .a) is well known in and from the literature. The following examples are 
provided in Hom 1989:226ff. 
(3) a. All that glitters is not gold. 
b .  Th ank  heaven, all scholars are not like this. 
c. Tout ce qui reluit n'est pas or. (=(3 .a» 
The question why and under which circumstances scope inversion is possible has 
provoked a fair amount of approaches in the last 25 or so years, see references 
in Hom 1989:226ff. An extensive and ingenious analysis is provided by 
lackendoff (1972: 352ft) for the English counterparts to (I), given in (4) . 
(4) a. ALL the men didn't  go. 
-\ / 
b .  ALL the men didn' t  go. 
---; -----------------, 
(B accent: -W) 
(A accent: V o) 
The analysis to be presented here basically preselVes Iackendoff's  insights albeit 
in a quite different way. 
I will proceed as follows. After introducing some basic assumptions (section 
2), I'll first discuss sentence ( 1 .a)/(2 .a) in detail, analyze its syntactic structure, 
derive the implicatures and show the disambiguating effects (section 3) . I ' ll then 
do the same for (1 .b)/(2 .b) ;" After that I return to sentences of the former type 
and adduce some minimally contrasting examples showing the semantic nature of 
the phenomenon discussed (section 5). This will lead us to some more general 
reflections about the issues involved (section 6) . 
2. Topics 
Topic and Focus marking are represented using SUbscripted brackets as illustrated 
in (5) . 
(5) a. [ALLh the men did [noth go . 
b .  [ALLEh Politiker sind [NICH1]p korrupt. 
all politicians are not corrupt 
c. Du [MUSSllT [NICH1]F so viel rauchen . 
you must n()t that much smoke 
I assume that Topic and Focus marking in sentences like (5) have a two main 
semantic and pragmatic effects: i) they determine the set of contexts in which the 
sentence can be uttered ; i i)  they yield certain i mplicatures (see Fery 1993 for the 
phonological aspect of Topic marking) . To flesh out what is  meant by this  we 
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need to introduce some machinery. 
For each sentence S we derive three different semantic objects, called its 
ordinary semantic value [ S ] 0, its Focus value [ S ] f and its Topic value [ S ] I. 
Focus value and ordinary value are defined as in Rooth 1985 : The ordinary value 
is a proposition, the Focus value is a set of propositions. What is new is the 
Topic value, a set of sets of propositions. Instead of going through the technical 
details, let us take (5 .a) as an example. 
(6) a. Ordinary meaning of (5.a) :  [ [allh men did [not]p go ] 0 = the 
proposition 'all men didn't go' 
b. Focus value of (5.a) :  HallJr men did [not]p go ] f = the set of 
propositions of the form 'all men did N go, '  where N is some type 
identical alternative to not (presumably not and the identity function) 
c. Topic value of (5.a) :  [ [allJr men did [not]p gO ] 1 = the set of Focus 
values F such that there is an alternative Q to all and F is a set of 
propositions of the form 'Q men did N go' where N is an alternative to 
not. 
These values might look as in (7). 
(7) a. "all men didn ' t go 
b.  {"all men went, "all men didn't go} 
c. {rall men went, "all men didn ' t go} , {Amost men went, "most men 
didn' t  go} , {Asome men went , Asome men didn't  go} , {"one man went, 
"'one man didn't  go} , . . . } 
What do we do with these objects? First , we can define the class of contexts in 
which a sentence with a certain Topic/Focus structure can be uttered. For the 
time being let us assume that a Context consists of a Common Ground CG, and 
a Discourse Topic , or D-Topic. The Common Ground is a set of worlds which 
represents the shared knowledge of speaker and hearer in much the sense of 
Stalnaker 1978.  The D-Topic is a set of propositions . For the time being we will 
only consider contexts in which the D-Topic is established by a preceding 
question. The meaning of a question Q, [ Q ]  0 is assumed to be the set of 
possible answers to Q. I assume that the following conditions must be met: 
(8) a. Given a question answer sequence Q A, [ Q ] 0 must be an element of 
[ A ] I. 
b .  Given a sentence A containing a Topic, there must b e  at least one 
disputable element in [ A ] I after uttering A.  
(9) a .  Disputability : A set  of  propositions P is  disputable wrt. a set of  worlds 
CG (the Convnon Ground) if  there is at least one element p in P such 
that both p and ""p could informatively and coherently be added to CG. 
a: formally :  DISP(P , CG) ,  i ff 3peP :  p n CG � CG & p n CG � 9  & 
( ""p) n CG � CG & ( ""p) n CG � 9  
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(10) Rephrasing (8 .b): A sentence A containing a Topic is utterable given a 
common ground CG only if 3Pe [ A  1 t & DISP(p ,CG n [ A D O) 
A set of disputable propositions induced by a Topic (P in the sense of (10» is 
called a Residual Topic. Let's  go see some examples: 
(1 1) A: Where are the unicorns? 
B: [SOME]r unicorns are [in the GARden]p 
Residual Topic: Where are the other unicorns? 
Speaker A asks for an answer of the type 'the unicorns are __ ' . Speaker B 
does not provide an exhaustive answer to that. Note that without the Topic 
marking on some, (l IB) would be illicit as an answer to ( 1 1A). The Topic accent 
marks a deviation from the original D-Topic established by A',s question. 
Formally, [ (l IB) ]  t contains sets of propositions of the form ' __ unicorns are 
__ ' , where both Topic and Focus are replaced by alternatives. One of these 
sets consists of propositions like 'the unicorns are __ ' .  Thus the question 
meaning can be found in the Topic value of the answer, as required by (8 .a) .  On 
the other hand, B's  answer leaves open a number of issues regarding the locus of 
unicorns. Formally, there are sets in [ (l 1B) ] t  whose members might or might 
not be true. The whereabouts of the other unicorns are one such issue, a Residual 
Topic in the sense of (S.b). Residual Topics mark the way the conversation will 
take next. They establish the 0-Topic for the next utterance. 
In Biiring 1994 and Bii�ng in prep. I discuss a number of usages of Topics 
all of which can ultimately be reduced to the constraints given in (S) . For 
example, Topics might shift a given 0-Topic (this is sometimes called 
'contrastive topic' ) :  
( 12) A:  Do you think that Fritz would buy this suit? 
B: Well [IJr certainly [WOULDN'l1p. 
Residual Topic: Would Fritz buy this suit? 
The implicature induced by a Topic can sometimes be used for its own sake, 
consider ( 13) .  
( 1 3) A:  Where were you at the time o f  the murder? 
B: [Ilr was [at HOME]p. 
Residual Topic: Where was the gardener? 
Here the Topic marking is not strictly speaking necessary. The sequence would 
be well formed with just the Focus accent. However, the Topic indicates that 
there are disputable alternatives to I wrt. to their alibi . Informally speaking, a 
Residual Topic is just an implicit question posed by an utterance containing a 
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Topic accent. A Residual Topic is reasonable (or disputable) if the answer to that 
question is not yet known given what is known through the Common Ground and 
the utterance itself. 
I said above that a sentence S cannot be uttered given a Context if it does 
match the current D-Topic (Le. the preceding question). Crucially, the same 
holds if there is no Residual Topic (formally one can think of this as (S .a)/(S.b) 
restricting the domain of the context changing function denoted by S; a sentence 
is infelicitous given a Context CX if ( S  J is not defined for CX). Let us add this 
to the record: 
(14) If a sentence S with a Topic accent is uttered given some Context CX, and 
there is no disputable Residual Topic the sentence establishes, the utterance 
of S in CX is infelicitous. 
This effect of Topic marking and in particular Residual Topics is crucial for the 
analysis to be presented. 
3. The Analysis of all . . .  not 
3. 1 .  7:he Structural Ambiguity 
Consider again the pertinent example: 
(15) a. IALL politicians are NOn corrupt. 
b.  IALLE Politiker sind NICHT\ korrupt. 
As noted, this sentence can only be understood to mean (I6 .a) 
rather than (I6.b) ,  
( 16) a. it is not the case that all politicians are corrupt 
b. for all politicians: it is not the case that they are corrupt 
In other words,  despite the surface order the negation has to take scope higher 
than the universal quantifier. This is why the phenomenon has been dubbed 
'Bereichsinversion' or 'Negationsinversion ' (scope reversal/negation reversal) . A 
reading like ( 1 6.b),  with the quantifier taking higher scope, is semantically well­
formed, but not available for (I5) .  This is different if the sentence bears a 
different accent pattern . In ( 17) I give some examples : 
( 17) a. ALLE\ Politiker sind nieht korrupt 
b. alle Politiker sind NICHn korrupt 
c .  alle Politiker sind nicht korRUpn 
These examples contain but a single Focus accent. In all the examples , reading 
( 1 6.b) i s  available, even preferred . 
I assume that scope ambiguity as well as scope reversal is in fact a syntactic 
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phenomenon. More precisely, I assume that phrases which take scope in position 
different from their surface position can do so by virtue of a trace left in some 
other positions, e.g. their base position. We represent this as syntactic 
reconstruction . 
One obvious possibility then is to reconstruct the subject al( politicians in 
(15) to its base structure position, which by assumption is the specifier of VP, 
which in tum is c-commanded by the negation. We thus derive an appropriate LP 
for the interpretation (16.a) of (15) .  
(18) a. LP-,V:  CP 
------
ez C' 
� 
sind IP 
are __________ 
ez l'  
------
VP 
� t '  y 
[nicht]p VP 
not __________ 
NPI 
[alleh Politiker 
. all politicians 
b. not(all(politician)(corrupt» 
V' 
� 
AP V 
korrupt tv 
corrupt 
That much is quite standard . However, reconstruction i s  not an obligatory 
process .  Even for this sentence it is not, as seen in ( 17).  The question we have 
to cope with then is what blocks a derivation in which all politicians remains in 
its surface position , yielding an LF corresponding to the unavailable reading 
( 16 .b) .  In other words,  why isn ' t  ( 15) ambiguous? Why isn ' t  there a second LF 
like ( 1 9)? 
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(19) a. LFv . :  CP 
-------
C' NPI 
[alleh Politiker 
all politicians 
� 
sind 
are 
IP 
-------
I' 
� 
� 1° 
� t '  • 
[nicht]p � 
not ---------
V' 
-------
AP V 
korrupt tv 
corrupt 
b . .  all(politicians)(Ax.not(corrupt(x» ) 
3. 2. The Semantic Conspiracy 
For ease of reference, let us refer to ( 1 8) as LF ·V and to (19) as LFV ' .  What 
we have to show is that something is wrong with LFv . - the one we cannot get 
for ( 15) .  Let us calculate the Topic implicatures for LFV ' .  First, what are the 
alternatives to all and to not? Let us assume that the alternatives to all are 
quantifiers such as some, most or nc and that the sole alternative to nct is the 
identity function . Then [ LFV ' ] '  is characterized by the formula in (20.b) , 
where ALT(X) is supposed to deliver type identical, contextually plausible 
alternatives to X. The set denoted by (20.b) might roughly look as in (20.c) .  
(20) a.  [all politicians [vp not [n are corrupt]]] 
b .  AP . 3Q<ct, < "" 1 »  [Q€ALT(all) & P =Ap. 3T<II> [TEALT(not) & 
p = "Q(Poli ticians) (Ax . '1'( corrupt(x» )]] 
c. { alI(politicians) (Ax . ·corrupt(x» ,  all(politicians)(Ax .corrupt(x»} , 
{most(politicians) (Ax . 'corrupt(x» , most(politicians)(Ax .corrupt(x» } ,  
{ some(politicians)(Ax . 'corrupt(x» , some(politicians)(Ax . corrupt(x» } ,  
{ one(politicians) (AX . 'corrupt(x» , one(politicians)(Ax . corrupt(x»} , 
{no(politic ians)(Ax . ' corrupt(x» , no(politicians)(Ax . corrupt(x»} } 
The implicature is . . .  
(2 1 )  after assertin g aU (polit icians) (Ax • •  corrupt (x)) , there i s  at least one set op 
propositions in IT LFv . ] I ( = (20 .a» which is disputable. 
Can (2 1 )  possibly be true? Remember that a disputable set of propositions 
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corresponds to a question whose answer is neither entailed nor excluded by the 
Common Ground CG. And remember, too, that CG is the Common Ground after 
asserting that all politicians are non-corrupt. Since we are considering these 
sentences without any specific context, we can safely assume that CG = [ (20. a) ] 0 
(possibly plus its presuppositions). 
Browsing through (20.c) we find that no disputable questions are left there. 
For one thing, any proposition of the form Q(politician) (>.x. "" corrupt(x» (with 
the exception of Q = no) is implied by alI(politicians) (>.x. ""corrupt(x». 
Likewise, their negations are excluded. For another, any proposition of the form 
Q(politician) (corrupt) (again with the exception of Q = no) is contradicted by 
all(politicians) (b. -' corrupt(x» . Their negations are implied . Finally,  
no (politician) (Xx. -, corrupt (x» (= 'every politician is corrupt') is contradicted 
by all(politicians) (>.x. -'corrupt(x» while no(politician) (Xx.corrupt(x» is equal 
to it, i .e. implied by it. 
We conclude that (2 1)  is not met. There is no Residual Topic in (20.a) . So 
that' s what is wrong with LFY "" .  As a next step we have to make sure that 
LF -,Y - the one representing the available reading of sentence (15) - is not 
subject to the same objections. So let us calculate [ LF-, Y ] \: 
(22) a. [vp not [vp all politicians [v' are corrupt])] 
b. AP. 3Q<r:l,<r:l,,» [QeALT(all) & P = Ap.3'11'<II> ['II'eALT(not) & 
p = ..... 1i"Q(politicians)(corrupt)]] 
Now again , let us search (22 .b) for disputable Residual Topics wrt . to a CG that 
includes -' all(politicians) (corrupt) . In (22 .c) I have crossed out all non­
disputable propositions : 
c. { =allij)elitieiaHs)(eeffi:li't), allij)elitieians) (eeffi:li't)] , 
{ -, most(politicians)(corrupt) , most(politicians)(corrupt)} ,  
{ -, some(politicians)(corrupt) , some(politicians)(corrupt)} ,  
{ -,one(politicians)(corrupt) , one(politicians)(corrupt)} ,  
{ -'no(politicians)(corrupt) , no(politicians)(corrupt)} } 
With rel ieve we notice that practically every set in [ LF -, Y ] \  remains a Residual 
Topic. None of the propositions is entailed or contradicted by the truth of 
-' aU(politician) (corrupt) . We thus predict that sentence ( 1 5) - on its LF "" Y  
reading - rai ses the question: 'But are there corrupt politicians at all? And if, 
how many? Or aren 't there any? ' And this is of course just what ( 1 5) expresses . 
4.  Must . . . not 
Let us now tum to the second example, ( 1 .b)/(2.b) : 
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(23) Du muBt nicht so viel rauchen. 
you must not so much smoke 
'You mustn't smoke that much. ' 
As before, the sentence as it stands is ambiguous between the 'don't smoke so 
much' and the 'you're not obliged to smoke that much' reading. If intonated in 
the by now familiar way, the fonner reading disappears. 
(24) Du lMUSST NICH1\ so viel rauchen. 
I should point out that the 'not allowed to' reading is hard to get for some 
speakers, while for others - including the author - it is almost the only available 
reading. These preferences seem to be dialectal as they can be assigned to certain 
regions. 
It is not hard to figure out where the ambiguity of (23) originates. What we 
must realize is that must not and need not are part of a Duality Group. If must is 
translated by D, must not corresponds to D . , while need not corresponds to 
• D (see LObner 1990 for extensive discussion ; he also pointed out the 
disambiguating function of the accent in the example, although he offers no 
account for it) . Given this, we can trace back the ambiguity of (23) to a 
structural fact, namely: Does the negation negate the inner VP (rauchen, 
' smoke')  or the outer one (milssen, 'must')? This is represented in (25). 
(25) a. LF . D :  
b .  LF D . : 
yp 
---------
[nicht]p VP 
not _________ 
VP 
-------
y o 
[muBth 
tyCtol Y' must 
YP 
------
so viel 
That much 
y o  
rauchen 
smoke 
--------
VP 
-----------
[nichtlF YP 
y o  
[muBth 
must 
not ______ 
so viel 
That much 
y o 
rauchen 
smoke 
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This structural ambiguity straightforwardly explains the two different readings. 
So what we have to show is that out of the two possible structures for (23) only 
one yields a reasonable implicature (i.e. a non-empty Residual Topic) if the 
sentence has the intonational structure as in (24). 
As indicated, (2S.a) shall be called LP..., O ,  and (2S.b) LP O ..., . LPO ..., is 
the one we want to exclude. Let [massen ] f  be the set of modal verb meanings, 
i .e. {must, may, need-not, may-not} and [ nicht ] I be the set containing 
negation and identity. As before, we start by calculating the implicatures of the 
non-available reading: 
(26) a. du [vp [vp nicht soviel rauchen] muBt ] 
b .  3M[MeALT(must) & P=}.p.3?r[?rEALT(not) & 
p =  .... M(?r(smokethatmuch(you» )]] 
c. { {  ....must(not(smokethatmuch(you» ) ,  .... must(smokethatmuch(you» } ,  
{ .... may(not( smokethatmuch(you» ) ,  .... may(smokethatmuch(you» } , 
{Aneed-not(not(smokethatmuch(you))) , Aneed­
not(smokethatmuch(you» } ,  {Amay-not(not(smokethatmuch(you))), 
Amay-not(smokethatmuch(you» } } 
And again , we find that (26.c) ,  in the light of the assertion made ('you have to 
not smoke that much') ,  contains no disputable propositions. To see this more 
clearly, let us use the following abbreviations : 0 = must, ..., 0 ..., = may, 
..., O =need-not, O "" =may-not, "" =not, X = smokethatmuch(you) . Then (26.c) 
equals (27) , where I have numbered the propositions for convenience (I have 
omitted the negated propositjons since they are included in [ (26.a) ] 1  anyway) : 
(27) { {  O ""x' , Oxb } , 
{ ..., O "" ""X', ..., O ""xd } ,  
{ ..., ° ""xc, ..., O i  } , 
{ O "" ""x' ,  O ""xb } }  
(must) 
(may) 
(need-not) 
(may not) 
Next note that necessarily the following relations hold between the formulae in 
(27) : 
(28) a. a - h ,  b - g ,  d -- e, f -- c 
b .  a "" ""d ,  f - ...,b 
c. a .... ...,b 
Now, by the assertion , a is given as an axiom. It follows that the truth value of 
every formula in (27)/(26 .c) is determined , namely: 
Since this is true in every possible world ,  it is  immaterial what the actual 
Common Ground looks like. Once a - 'you have to not smoke that much' - i s  
added to  the Common Ground , the resulting Common Ground wil l  necessarily 
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imply the truth of (29) . So there are no disputable propositions in [ LFO -, D '. 
hence no Residual Topic. 
As before, we have derived why LF 0 -, is inappropriate given the 
intonational structure of (24) . Finally we have to check whether LF-' O  i s  
wellformed according to our criterion: 
(30) a. 
b. 
c. 
du nicht [yp [yp soviel rauchen] muBt ] 
3M[MEALT(must) & P=)..p.3T[rEALT(not) & 
p="1r(M(smokethatmuch(you» )]] 
{ {"not(must(smokethatmuch(you))) , "must(smokethatmuch(you»} , 
{"not(may(smokethatmuch(you» ) ,  "may(smokethatmuch(you» } ,  
{"not(need-not(smokethatmuch(you» ) ,  "need­
not(smokethatmuch(you» } ,  {Anot(may-not(smokethatmuch(you) » ,  
"may-not(smokethatmuch(you» } } 
d .  { {  -' Ox· , Oxb } ,  (must) 
(may) 
(need-not) 
(may not) 
{ -. -. O -'x·, -' O -'xd } , 
{ -. -. Ox·, -' 0Xf } ,  
{ -, O -'x', O -'X' } }  
e. a - f, b - e, a - -.b 
In (30.d) I have given the modal logic formulae corresponding to (30.c) ,  plus 
their logical relations «30. e» . As can be seen, c/h and dig are still disputable. 
In ordinary words: 
(3 1) a. Du MUST NICHT .soviel rauchen . Vielleicht DARFST du nicht einmal 
soviel rauchen . 
b .  You don ' t  have t o  smoke that much . Perhaps you even mustn ' t  smoke 
that much . [g/d v s .  h/c] . 
This then concludes our argument. We have seen that with both examples, all 
politicians are not corrupt and you musm 'tlneedn 't smoke that much a structural 
ambiguity is resolved by the intonation , more specifically by the Topic accent 
and its implicatures . To be sure, there are two LFs for each of these sentences 
which are well-formed by syntactic criteria. But one of them cannot be 
interpreted in a coherent way, i . e .  respecting the function of the Topic accent. So 
that LF i s  'fil tered out ' .  
Formally , w e  saw that LFv -. an d  LF O -. necessarily imply al l  their Topic 
alternatives. The context change functions denoted by these particular sentences 
(where sentence means: syntactic structure plus Topic/Focus structure) has an 
empry domain . There is no context in which these sentences could felicitously be 
uttered . Syntactically  they are wel lformed ,  but nevertheless they will never occur 
in  natural language. The are 'unpragmatic' , if you like. 
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5. The Impact of Lexical Choice 
5. 1 .  Quantifiers other than All/Every 
A next thing to nole is that there are cases parallel to Jacob's (2.a) - not 
discussed by him - in which scope reversal is not obligatory, e .g . the following. 
(32) a. TWo [thirds]r of the politicians are [not]p corrupt. 
b. Zwei IDRITrEL der Politiker sind NICH1\ korrupt. 
In these examples, the subject quantifiers may take scope either higher or lower 
than the negation. To elucidate both readings here, let me provide you with two 
different contexts: 
(33) A: And so it seems to me that two thirds of the politicians are corrupt. 
B:  That's an exaggeration. Half of them might be, but two ITInRDS of 
the politicians are NOT\ corrupt. ( . . .  not . . .  two thirds . . .  ) 
(34) A: You can't deny the moral decline of politics . Just look at the statistics: 
45 cases of corruption within one year. 
B:  Take a positive look at that : Two ITInRDS of  the politicians are NOT\ 
corrupt. ( . . .  two thirds . . . not . . .  ) 
This is just what we expect given a reconstruction treatment of these cases: 
Reconstruction of the subject NP to SpecV is optional, the sentence is 
ambiguous. But of course we predict that there is a further prerequisite for the 
virtual ambiguity of these sentences, namely that both LFs yield reasonable 
implicatures. In other words, there have to be alternative questions in [ (32.b) ] '  
which are still disputable after uttering these sentences . Let me demonstrate this 
informally, starting with reading (33) , i .e .  the LF with reconstruction , yielding 
(35) It is not the case that two thirds of the politicians are corrupt 
Now, we might continue this Sentence by saying 
(36) . . . and it might or might not be the case that there are in fact no corrupt 
politicians 
Note that 'it is (not) the case that no politicians are corrupt' is among the 
alternatives in [ (32 .b) ] '. So the requirement 'have reasonable implicatures' is  
met. This ,  however, i s  the simple case, basically parallel to the available reading 
of sentence (2.a) .  Let us now turn to the other reading , which was unavailable 
for the examples discussed so far: 
(37) a. two thirds of the politicians are non-corrupt 
b .  . . .  an d  it may or may not b e  the case that some politicians are corrupt. 
The Great Scope Inversion Conspiracy 
Again, (37 .b) is an element of an element in [ (32.b) ] ,  on that reading . So this 
LF, too, has a non-empty residual Topic, correctly predicting the ambiguity. 
5. 2. Foci different from not 
So far, we .have seen the contrast between quantifiers like two thirds or almost 
all which yield a sensible reading with and without reconstruction and quantifiers 
like all or every which do not. The next thing to note is that all and every allow 
for ambiguities as well, if the element in Focus is different from 1IOt. For 
example, the sentences in (38 .a) and (38.b) are ambiguous between the reading 
in (38 .c) and (38.c') ,  despite the fact that the Topic is a universal quantifier: 
(38) a. I ALL politicians are RAREL Y\ drunk. 
b. IALLE Politiker sind SELTEN\ betrunken. 
c. it is rarely the case that all politicians are drunk 
c! for every politician: it is rarely the case that she or he is drunk 
(38.c) allows for some politicians being alcoholics and even for a number of 
them drinking together fairly often. (38.c') on the other hand is stronger. It 
asserts that no politician is drunk regularly. The latter reading might be harder 
to get, but consider the following sequence: 
(39) IALL politicians are RARELy\ drunk, and most of them never. 
First, let me give an example of a possible residual Topic for each of the 
readings : 
(40) a. it i s  rarely the case that all politicians are drunk 
a! . . . but is it rare that most politicians are? 
b. for every politician : it  is  rarely the case that she or he is  drunk 
b :  . . .  but are there politicians which are never drunk? 
As can be seen , there are alternatives to rarely and every that yield disputable 
Residual Topics on both scopings . Intuitively speaking , rarely is less absolute 
than 1IOt. Accordingly, there are disputable alternatives to it. Which brings us  
straightforwardly to  our  next i ssue , namely . . . 
6. Scales 
Right now, we have extended our database to non-absolute elements such as 
rarely, often and most or some. So let us ask whether there is  a more general 
principle to be deduced from the cases discussed. In general , we can say that 
unavailable readings occur only with elements that mark the end of some scale 
(for a much more thorough discussion of impl icational scales see e . g.  Horn 
1989:chap . 4) .  Such a scale we find with the quantifi ers , with quantifying 
adverbials and with adverbials of completeness as in (4 1 . c) . 
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(4 1) a. all > most > some > one 
a! alle > die meisten > einige > ein 
b.  always > often > sometimes > once 
b! immer > oft > manchmal > einmal 
c.  totally > quite > somewhat > a little 
c! ganz > ziemlich > etwas > ein bi.6chen 
The scales are ordered by implication, i .e. 'all �' implies 'most � ' ,  the latter 
implies ' some � '  and so forth. Next recall that � - r is equivalent to "' r  -
..,(>, i.e. the scales in (4 1) can be inverted: 
(42) a. no (not one) > not some > not most > not all 
a! kein (nicht ein) > nicht einige > nicht die meisten > nicht alle 
b .  never (not once) > not sometimes > not often > not always 
b: niemals (nicht einmal) > nicht manchmal > nicht oft > nicht immer 
. c. not at all (not a little) > not somewhat > not quite > not totally 
c! iiberhaupt nicht (nicht ein billchen) > nicht etwas > nicht ziemlich > 
nicht ganz 
'no �' implies 'not some � ' ,  the latter implies 'not most �' and so forth . As 
suggested in (42 .c) ,  we can understand nor/nicht to be the endpoint of a scale as 
well. 
If an element is not maximal on the scale, there will always be alternatives 
to it (i .e.  other elements on the same scale) which are possibly true and possibly 
false, hence disputable. Thq� elements by themselves guarantee that there are 
viable alternatives to them . An element that marks the endpoint of a scale , call 
it an extreme, implies its scalar alternatives . It might yield disputable alternatives 
only by virtue of a second alternative inducing element. This is what happens in 
the case of 'not . . . all' or 'not . . .  must' or 'never all ' .  Although for example 'never 
all �' implies the falsehood of ' sometimes all �' or 'often all � ' ,  it still could be 
the case that ' sometimes some �' or 'often most � ' .  On the other hand , with 
constellations like 'all . . .  not'  or ' must not ' ,  neither elem ent can induce 
alternatives. Let us call elements like all, always, or totally positive extremes and 
expressions like never, not and no negative extremes. A look at the examples 
discussed so far reveals that exactly one case is excluded : 
(43) if two extremes form a bridge accent, the positive extreme may not take 
scope over the negative extreme 
For example, 'not. . . all' is permitted in such a configuration , but 'all . .  . not' is 
not, because the positive extreme 'all '  outscopes the negative one, 'not' . Why 
does (43) hold in this form? The reason can best be seen if we again translate our 
quantificational elements into quantifiers of second order predicate logic . Positive 
extremes are then represented by V�, negative ones by "' 3� ,  or, equivalently: 
V ..,�. The two possible scope configurations of extremes can now be represented 
as in (44) , where > stands to mean 'takes scope over ' :  
The Great Scope Inversion Conspiracy 
(44) a. negative > positive : " 3v4> == v ., v4> 
b. positive > negative: Y " 34> == YY ., 4>  
(44 .b) is the unavailable reading, and the reason is  now plain to see: Both 
universal quantifiers represent positive extremes on the scale, i . e. they both 
imply the truth of the formula for any of their scalar alternatives. In (44.a) on 
the other hand, the negation intervenes between the two universal quantifiers, 
switching the scale. In other words, a structure with two quantifiers will never 
have disputable alternatives, if both quantifiers are universal (i. e. extremes) and 
'adjacent. '  If this is correct, (43) can in fact be sharpened even more: 
(45) If two extremes a a form a bridge accent, with a taking scope over a, a 
must not be a positive extreme. 
In other words, the positive extreme should neither be able to outscope a 
negative extreme nor should it cooccur with another positive extreme. Scope 
ambiguities with bridge accents on scalar extremes should occur only if both 
elements involved are either negative extremes or non-extremes. As far as I can 
tell , these predictions are borne out: 
(46) a. * IALLE Politiker sind IMMER\ betrunken. 
all politicans are always drunk 
(two positives, both orderings impossible) 
b .  lKEIN Politiker ist NIB\ betrunken. 
no politician is never drunk 
(two negatives ,  both readings possible, surface order preferred) 
c. I ALLE Politiker sind NIB\ betrunken. 
all politicians are never drunk 
(one positive, one negative : only neg > pos,  i .e. obligatory scope 
inversion) 
d .  lKEIN Politiker ist IMMER\ betrunken . 
no politician is a/ways drunk 
(one negative, one positive: only neg > pos, i . e. scope inversion 
impossible) 
The cases of negation reversal thus reduce to this general case once we realize 
that not is a negative extreme on a (possibly two-membered) scale. Scope 
inversion - as well as ' scope fixing ' as in (46 . d) - with all sorts of 
'quantificational' elements follow from very general principles of syntax and 
pragmatics, once the effect of the Topic marking is  properly understood . 
6. 1 .  Modals that Express Possibility 
Having said this we can readily account for another apparently puzzling fact 
about the seoping of modal s and negation . Remember that in the must . . . not case 
discussed in section 5 . ,  a bridge accent forces the not (must) reading, i . e. highest 
scope for the negation . However, if we replace miissen by ktinnen ' can ' ,  the facts 
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seem to be the mirror image of the mllssen case: 
(47) a. Sie kann nicht so viel getrunken haben. 
she can 7/()t so much drunk have 
'She can't have drunk that much. ' 
b. Sie IKANN NICHT\ so viel getrunken haben. 
'She might have not drunk that much. ' 
b:  She [might)y have [not]p drunk that much. 
Sentence (47.b) displays exactly the same intonational pattern as (2.b) above. 
However, here the Bridge Accent forces a reading where the negation has scope 
lower than the modal, yielding: 'It is possible that she hasn't drunk that much . '  
That is, similar to the cases discussed in section 5 . ,  there i s  no straightforward 
correlation between Bridge Accent and scope of the negation. However, the data 
follow immediately from the account given here. For note that with can, the 
stronger reading is the one with the negation scoping over the modal, not(can) 
or -,(  0 ('1/"», which is equivalent to 0(-' ('1/"» . And .again, given such a strong 
assertion there cannot possibly be alternatives M to can which would make M(d 
disputable . So if the accent pattern indicates that there must be a Residual Topic, 
the weaIcer reading, can(not) or 0 (-'('1/"» 55 -'(0 ('1/"» is forced , making room 
for alternatives as in (48) . 
(48) a. Sie [kann)y [nicht]p so viel getrunken haben, aber es ist wahrscheinlich , 
daB sie soviel getrunken hat. 
b. She might have no� drunk that much , but she is likely to have. 
With the modal mllssen 'must' , on the other hand, the weaker reading is obtained 
by giving the negation wide scope, as we have seen above. So while the 
phenomenon is entirely the same semantically and pragmatically ( -, 0  55 0 -'  
in the Bridge Accent case), the syntactic structure in the one case is the mirror 
image of that in the other. 
7. Summary 
This paper has lead us through quite a global conspiracy of syntax, intonation , 
(lexical) semantics and pragmatics . Since factors from all these domains enter 
into determining whether or not a sentence (with a given intonational contour) 
virtually has certain readings, the picture that has emerged is quite complex . On 
the other hand, the set of assumptions put to u se to handle the scope inversion 
data discussed in this chapter is quite small , containing almost only assumptions 
independently proposed and needed . The Topic marking as discussed and 
formalized here and elsewhere provides us - I think - with the missing piece of 
the mosaic that we need in order to derive the facts correctly, abandoning the 
need for additional mechanisms. If the results of this paper are by and large 
correct, they provide evidence for both this intermodular but conceptually simple 
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way of treating scope inversion and the theory of Topics . 
8. Endnotes 
* (part of) this material was presented at Frankfurt, TIibingen, Berlin, 
Copenhagen and Austin in 1994/5. I would like to thank the audiences for 
their helpful comments, in particular Regine Eckardt, Katharina Hartmann, 
Ray Jackendoff, Gerhard Jager, Inga Kohlhof, Horst Lohnstein, and Amim 
von Stechow. 
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